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Abstract
Cybersecurity cannot be ensured with mere technical solutions. Hackers often use fraudu-
lent emails to simply ask people for their password to breach into organizations. This tech-
nique, called phishing, is a major threat for many organizations. A typical prevention
measure is to inform employees but is there a better way to reduce phishing risks? Experi-
ence and feedback have often been claimed to be effective in helping people make better
decisions. In a large field experiment involving more than 10,000 employees of a Dutch
ministry, we tested the effect of information provision, simulated experience, and their com-
bination to reduce the risks of falling into a phishing attack. Both approaches substantially
reduced the proportion of employees giving away their password. Combining both interven-
tions did not have a larger impact.
Introduction
Phishing attacks, the attempt to deceptively acquire personal and/or financial information
(usernames, passwords etc.) by electronic communication, pose a significant threat for organi-
zations. Social networks are increasingly used in phishing attacks but phishing by emails
remains the main risk in an organizational setting. This is due to the relative simplicity of
designing and sending phishing emails and its potential to reach many individuals at the same
time. The text of a phishing email mostly addresses the recipient with urgency cues, words that
invoke feelings of vulnerability or threat, in order to try to force the recipient to act immedi-
ately and impulsively. These urgency cues are most deceitful, because they turn attention away
from other cues that may potentially help the receiver to recognize a phishing email [1].
Attackers can also trick users into downloading malicious malware, after they click on a link
embedded in the email [2]. In recent years, phishing emails have evolved from poorly-designed
and untargeted texts into highly personalized and sophisticated messages, which has made
recipients more likely to believe that the content is expected and legitimate [3, 4].
In order to cope with increased information security threats and ensure information secu-
rity, organizations actively take technical security measures [5]. Although these protective
mechanisms contribute to improved information security [6], it is rarely enough to entirely
rely on them [7]. Organizations that deploy both technical and non-technical protective
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means are likely to be more successful in protecting against information security risks [8–10].
Organizations create policies and procedures to ensure information security [11]. Although
constructing policies and procedures is an essential outset, it is not enough to make sure
employees comply with them. Vulnerabilities of the human factor in information security are
usually ascribed to non-intentional behavior. Some may simply lack knowledge, skills and abil-
ities to protect themselves against threats, and to comply with existing policies [12].
Is it enough to increase knowledge by providing more information to employees or should
companies look for alternative approaches, letting employees experience (a simulated version
of) the threat? Cai and Song [13] showed that insurance take-up increased after people played
an insurance game. In many cases, people who are victims of phishing fraud never realize
that they have been a victim of a phishing attempt or realize it too late, when the extremely
negative consequences occur. Letting employees experience (simulated) phishing fraud can
complement general information provision. It can make them more receptive to the
information.
In a large field experiment, we studied the effect of information provision and experience in
reducing the phishing risks. Although existing studies have examined the impact of training
and simulation on susceptibility to phishing fraud [14–20], many studies involved role-play
activities or lab experiments. In lab experiments, the possibility of phishing email tends to be
salient and day-to-day distractions, which increase phishing susceptibility in the real world,
are absent. Field experiments avoid these problems but are more difficult to organize. A large-
scale field experiment was conducted on students and staff of a university by Mohebzada et al.
[21]. The authors found that warnings about phishing risk were not sufficient to prevent users
from responding to phishing emails. Other field experiments have been conducted to study
the risk factors [22–24] and the effectiveness of phishing exercises in organizations [25] when
phishing emails vary in terms of persuasiveness.
Our experiment was conducted at the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, with more than
10,000 subjects who were unaware that they participated in such an experiment. We were
thereby able to avoid the many biases which arise in a laboratory experimental setting, and
managed to observe actual behavior in a setup that closely mirrors an actual phishing attack.
Our experiment consisted of a control and three treatments: information, experience, and
both. Information provision aimed at increasing (procedural) knowledge whereas simulated
experience could make employees more alert about the threat and more receptive to informa-
tion. Many authors have argued that combining information and simulated experience leads
to stronger effects [14, 15, 19, 20]. Our experimental design allowed us to test for the existence
of such synergies. Besides testing the overall effectiveness of our interventions, we were able to
study whether gender, age, and employment contract affect an individual’s susceptibility to
phishing fraud. This information is of great value to policymakers both within and outside of
corporations, as they enable targeted interventions [26].
In the experiment, we sent a phishing email to measure the susceptibility of employees to
click on a dubious link and then give away their password. About one third of the subjects
clicked on the link in our control treatment and 22% gave their password. Informing subjects
about the risks of phishing reduced the proportion of subjects clicking on the link by 7 points
and the proportion of password given away by 6 points. A first experience with a phishing
email reduced the proportion of subjects clicking on the link by 9 points and of providing
their password by 8 points. Combining both the information campaign and the experience
intervention did not substantially improve the results with respect to experience alone. Overall,
in an organization of the size of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, letting all employees
experience one phishing email can avoid that 800 passwords are given away.
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Conceptual framework
Several models have been proposed to explain phishing susceptibility. They include individual
factors (personality, perception, knowledge, motivation) and phishing email characteristics
[27, 28]. The latter cannot be influenced by the (victim) organization and we therefore focus
on the former.
Due to limited attentional resources, people often rely on automatic or heuristic processing
when reading e-mails, increasing the likelihood that people click on links or download malignant
software [27]. The level of heuristic processing are influenced by cyber-risk beliefs, which refer
to the perception that people have about online threats, and which are influenced by the degree
of experience, efficacy, and knowledge that people have on the subject. According to the suspi-
cion cognition automaticity model (SCAM) [27], suspecting a specific email to be a phishing
email is directly and indirectly influenced by general cyber-risk beliefs, which include risk per-
ception. Higher risk perception obviously makes people more suspicious about emails but also
makes them rely less on heuristic processing and more on systematic processing when reading
emails [27]. A deeper, more systematic processing of the information contained in the emails,
including the cues signaling phishing threats, makes people better able to detect phishing attacks.
Drawing from the field of education science, a simulated experience is argued to be an
effective substitute for learning from an actual experience, especially when simulations provide
concrete and emotionally charged experiences [29]. Similar to an experience of an actual
phishing email, a simulated phishing email may in this way increase risk perception and subse-
quently the level of systematic processing and the degree of suspicion applied to future emails.
Knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the information the receiver has about the domain of
the threat, the ways to detect it and the required actions [26, 28]. Information provision may
increase knowledge about the prevalence of phishing attacks and the risks these pose. The
information can be about how to detect phishing emails and how to deal with them, which can
raise efficacy. Increased knowledge and efficacy together may increase cyber-risk beliefs and
subsequently lower the reliance on heuristic processing.
Many papers recommend to incorporate information and experience of phishing emails
into one training material [14, 15, 19, 20]. Crucial is to embed the training in the employees’
natural environment [30]. Arachchilage et al. [31] found that combining conceptual knowl-
edge and procedural knowledge is key in enhancing phishing detection and avoidance. A one-
time simulated experience is more likely to affect conceptual knowledge (“know that”) than
the procedural knowledge (“know how”). Repeated simulated experience could also improve
procedural knowledge if sufficient feedback is provided. Information provision can target
both. Yet, giving information after employees have received a phishing email can increase the
perceived relevance of the information. Information campaigns about procedures to avoid
phishing have indeed been found to have greater impact after users have fallen for an attack
[32]. From the literature we therefore expect both simulated experience and information pro-
vision to be effective, but we also expect their combination to be most effective.
Method
To test the effectiveness of combining (one-time) experience and information provision on
phishing risks, we conducted a large-scale field experiment. The main characteristics of the
experiment are outlined below, with further details in S1 Appendix.
Subjects and design
The subjects of this experiment were 10,929 employees of the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs, out of the 12,567 official employees of the Ministry. Reasons for exclusions were
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mostly technical (e.g., missing information), or related to the rank at the Ministry (Minister,
Secretary General. . .). Details are reported in S1 Appendix. Most subjects were males (60,6%),
with an average age of 47 years. Subjects learned that they were part of an experiment only
after the experiment was conducted.
We implemented two interventions: information provision (Info) and experience (Exp).
We used a 2x2 design and subjects were divided into four groups of roughly equal size: Control
(2723 employees), Info (2740), Exp (2724) and ExpInfo (2742).
The experiment was organized around five specific dates T 2 {1, . . ., 5} (see Table 1 for the
exact dates). All four groups received an email that resembled a real phishing email at T = 5. In
the following, we simply refer to this and all other such emails that we sent a simply phishing
email. The first treatment group (Info) received an information email in T = 2, T = 3 and T = 4
with information about what phishing is and how it works (T = 2), how one can recognize
phishing emails (T = 3), and what one should do when receiving a phishing email (T = 4). The
second treatment group (Exp) was sent a phishing email at time T = 1 and a short debriefing
email explaining that the sent email was fake at the end of the same day. No information was
given that the emails were part of an experiment. The third treatment group (ExpInfo),
received both interventions, thus the phishing email and debriefing email at T = 1 and the
information emails at T = 2, T = 3 and T = 4. One day after the phishing mail at T = 5, all four
groups received a general debriefing. Table 1 below summarizes the experimental timeline and
gives the exact dates of the experiment.
The choice of the timeline followed several constraints. First, to be in line with our concep-
tual framework, experience had to precede information. We would then expect subjects from
the ExpInfo treatment to be more alert about phishing and more receptive to information
about it than those from the Info treatment, who were not exposed to the first phishing experi-
ence. Second, to avoid having one very long email that might discourage readers, the informa-
tion provided was split between three emails, which were spread over three weeks. Third, we
waited one additional week after the end of the Info and ExpInfo interventions before sending
the final phishing email. Sending the final phishing email later was not possible because many
employees would be on vacation (Christmas break). Sending it earlier was undesirable. An
email on the same day or a day later than the Info and ExpInfo interventions might be too eas-
ily detectable, inflating the measured effectiveness of these treatments. A similar one-week
delay was used for instance by Xiong et al. [30] to study the effect of training on phishing
detection.
A privacy impact assessment was drawn up to identify potential issues concerning privacy
and informed consent. Based on this, the following measures were taken: (1) the analysis was
done on anonymized data, the reporting of the results is only on the basis of aggregated data;
(2) prior to the experiment the general norm of Information Security System Policy compli-
ance was posted on the intranet; (3) the Employees Council of the Ministry was informed;
(4) passwords and other information given by employees were not recorded; and (5) after the
Table 1. Experimental timeline.
T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5
05/11/2015 19/11/2015 26/11/2015 03/12/2015 15/12/2015
Control Phishing mail + debriefing
Info Infographic 1 Infographic 2 Infographic 3 Phishing mail + debriefing
Exp Phishing mail + short debriefing Phishing mail + debriefing
ExpInfo Phishing mail + short debriefing Infographic 1 Infographic 2 Infographic 3 Phishing mail + debriefing
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.t001
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experiment, employees were debriefed through an extensive email and were provided with
contact details of the researchers. The secretary general and head of internal organization/
chief information officer of the ministry gave their (written) approval of the research.
Group formation
We randomized the subjects at the level of the lowest known organizational unit, henceforth
referred to as “basic unit”. In total we had 184 unique basic units, with an average of 61 sub-
jects per basic unit. We have not opted for randomization at the individual level to avoid con-
tamination of the results by intervention spillover effects. With randomization at the
individual level, it would have been possible that two subjects working together were divided
into different treatment groups. This could have led some subjects to be affected by more than
one treatment.
Table 2 shows the distribution of subjects across the four groups. We ran Kruskall-Wallis
tests to check if the subjects were equally divided between groups in terms of age, age-groups,
gender, employment contract (internal/external), and (the five largest) organizational division
(in this paper we refer to them as A, B, C, D, E). Test results showed no statistically significant
differences between groups in all variables except, as could be expected, for organizational
division (S1 Table). Not all organizational divisions had the same number of basic units (with
division A even having only one basic unit) and the size of the basic units varied substantially.
We will control for divisional differences in our analysis but it is worth noting that our ran-
domization was successful on all other aspects.
Unfortunately (and out of our control), after the first phishing email at T = 1, an online
notification was posted for the employees in organizational division C, stating that the
phishing email that some employees received was a fake one. Hence the subjects in the Con-
trol and Info groups received this notification as well. This may have affected the results as it
created intervention spillover effects within that division. We would then expect treatments
effects to be smaller for that division. In what follows, we will always report the analysis with
and without this division. Including the division can be expected to give more conservative
estimates. Table 3 shows the characteristics of the reduced sample. The distributions of
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Group N. of subjects Male Age Internal Employee Organisational division
Mean 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 >55 A B C D E
Control 2723 60.52% 47.45 2.90% 10.54% 26.07% 35.51% 24.97% 80.21% – 14.18% 33.79% 19.32% 32.72%
Info 2740 61.06% 47.35 2.04% 15.26% 25.69% 28.39% 28.61% 79.34% 9.56% 12.23% 19.60% 13.61% 45.00%
Exp 2724 59.99% 47.05 2.86% 13.07% 28.45% 29.22% 26.40% 80.76% – 10.17% 27.09% 25.33% 37.41%
ExpInfo 2742 60.76% 47.31 2.12% 12.65% 26.81% 33.33% 25.09% 80.49% – 12.47% 26.99% 28.05% 32.49%
Whole sample 10929 60.58% 47.29 2.48% 12.88% 26.75% 31.61% 26.27% 80.20% 2.4% 12.26% 26.86% 21.58% 36.91%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.t002
Table 3. Descriptive statistics after the exclusion of division C.
Group N. of subjects Male Age Internal Employee Organisational division
Mean 16-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 >55 A B D E
Control 1803 60.68% 47.45 0.94% 11.15% 29.62% 34.33% 23.96% 70.27% – 21.41% 29.17% 49.42%
Info 2203 56.83% 45.69 2.36% 17.43% 28.92% 28.92% 22.38% 74.58% 11.89% 15.21% 16.93% 55.97%
Exp 1986 58.91% 46.14 2.82% 14.20% 31.77% 28.30% 22.91% 74.42% – 13.95% 34.74% 51.31%
ExpInfo 2002 60.24% 46.72 2.35% 13.34% 29.27% 31.72% 23.33% 73.53% – 17.08% 38.41% 44.51%
Reduced sample 7994 59.07% 46.46 2.15% 14.19% 29.87% 30.69% 23.10% 73.30% 3.28% 16.76% 29.50% 50.46%
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.t003
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different groups show significant differences on this sample (see S1 Table for Kruskall-Wal-
lis test results).
Procedure
Pre-intervention period (all groups). We first ensured minimum knowledge about the
information security policy of the ministry by posting a service notice on the intranet of all
five organizational divisions of the ministry prior to the experiment, and visible to all subjects.
This message explained the dangers of giving away personal details. Furthermore, the message
stated that the Ministry or a division of the Ministry would never ask employees for their pass-
word, username etc (S1 Appendix).
T = 1: First phishing email: Simulating experience and feedback (groups Exp and
ExpInfo. Subjects from the Exp and ExpInfo treatments received an imitation of a real phish-
ing email. The subject line was: “Economic Affairs—Mobile Password Recovery System”. This
email was sent by the operational management, and subjects were asked to link their account
to their mobile phone number in order to recover their password easily if it was lost, or to
change it.
The email contained several characteristics enabling receivers to assess the email as being
fake/fraudulent, presenting more or less the same level of difficulty as phishing emails that
were actually sent at that period. These characteristics were: (1) a misspell in the sender email,
(2) inappropriate use of capital letters in the subject line, (3) a change in the logo and logo
color, (4) an unusual form of salutation for the Ministry, (5) addressing the receiver in the for-
mal form instead of the informal form, which is normally used, (6) a hyperlink in the email
that refers to a vague website with an extension that would normally not be used within the
Ministry (.net) and (7) two different but resembling fonts in the main text and the disclaimer
(S1 Appendix).
We chose an email subject and sender, which we believed to be equally relevant to most
subjects. The link in the email redirected the subjects to a “fake” website (www.
mobilepasswordrecoverysystem.net). This website had a very basic design and contained a few
elements of the governmental visual design style, with some modifications. In order to link
their accounts and phone numbers, subjects were asked to fill in three personal details; (1) user-
name, (2) password, and (3) phone number. After filling in the details, subjects were redirected
to a second screen, thanking them for the registration and stating that the registration would
be completed within five working days. It was not necessary to fill in all the three personal
details. Even if a subject filled in only one field and clicked on “send”, s/he was directed to the
second screen that thanked for his/her registration (S1 Appendix).
At the end of the day, all subjects from treatments Exp and ExpInfo received a short debrief-
ing explaining that the email was an “imitation” email designed to increase awareness for
phishing fraud. No information was given that the email was part of an experiment or that
there would be follow-up actions (S4 Fig). The debriefing email focused on important it was
that all employees contribute to a safer digital environment. By receiving that email, subject
could also learn whether they had made a mistake or not. There was no information about
how to recognize phishing, nor about how to react. Subjects from the ExpInfo treatment would
receive such information in the following weeks, as described next.
T = 2,3,4: Information provision—Infographics (groups Info and ExpInfo). Subjects in
treatments Info and ExpInfo received emails explaining ways to avoid falling for phishing
attacks. This information provision occurred in three consecutive weeks, using colorful info-
graphics to maximize the impact of the treatments. The first email explained what phishing is
and how it works, the second how receivers could recognize them, and the third what actions
Informing, simulating experience, or both: A field experiment on phishing risks
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receivers should undertake when they receive a phishing email (S1 Appendix). The info-
graphics were designed in a way that (a) makes the subjects understand the risks, (b) keeps the
message simple and short, (c) provides clear actionable items that subjects can easily adopt,
and (d) uses story-based graphics as suggested by Kumaraguru et al., 2007 and Sheng et al.,
2007 [14, 15].
T = 5: Second phishing email (all groups). All subjects of the four groups received a (sec-
ond) phishing email forty days after the subjects in treatments Exp and ExpInfo had received a
phishing email and twelve days after the subjects from the Info and ExpInfo treatments had
received the last infographics. The second phishing email resembled the first one in terms of
looks, length, and recognizable characteristics of phishing mails. Subjects from the Info and
ExpInfo) treatments who would apply the recommendations they received in the infographics
should recognize it as a phishing email.
This email was sent by the IT department of the Ministry (with a misspelling in the sender
address: helpdesk@dlctu.nl instead of helpdesk@dictu.nl). Subjects were told that they had
reached their maximum storage limit of Outlook and the limit had to be raised via a hyperlink
to www.verhooogjeopslaglimiet.net, which can be translated as www.increaseyourstoragelimit.
net (S1 Appendix). The email asked for an immediate action of the subjects. If they clicked on
the link in the email, they were directed to the website. The website they would reach was
again basic, with some visuals of Outlook Exchange, subjects were told that by filling in e-mail,
username and password, limits could be raised up to 8 GB. If the subject indeed filled in the
details, a pop-up screen was shown, stating that the registration was being processed and that
it would be completed within five workdays (S6, S7 and S8 Figs).
Post-intervention period—Debriefing (all groups). All subjects received a general
debriefing the day after receiving the (second) phishing email. In this elaborate debriefing the
subjects were told that the phishing email(s) and information mails were part of an experi-
ment. They were given information about; (1) the cause and purpose of the research, (2) the
design of the research, (3) which precautions had been taken in order to respect the privacy of
employees and to protect (personal) details, and (4) where subjects could submit other ques-
tions and/or remarks.
Furthermore, they were informed that the experiment was part of the campaign iBewust-
zijn (Information awareness). With this campaign the Ministry aimed to encourage and sup-
port its employees as much as possible in developing knowledge and awareness regarding
information security. Also, it reassured the employees that the phishing mail was fake, such
that no consequences were attached if subjects indeed had filled in personal details.
Analysis
Data was collected on whether a subject had clicked on the link and had filled in one or more
personal details, and the time of completion. For privacy concerns, the content of what sub-
jects had filled in was not registered. The analysis was conducted on 10,929 observations from
the whole sample and on 7,994 observations when division C was excluded.
We measured falling for phishing with three dummy variables: Visit, Fill and Fill|Visit. Visit
indicates whether the subject clicked on the link and visited the website. Irrespective of
whether the subjects filled in personal details, clicking on a link embedded in a phishing email
by itself can be very dangerous since such links may infect computers with malware. Fill takes
value 1 if the subject filled in their password. Although the subjects could also fill in their user-
name or mobile phone number/email address, we chose password as the variable of interest
since we regard it as the most confidential data among all and no subjects filled in only the
password, supporting the idea that people are more reluctant to give this information away.
Informing, simulating experience, or both: A field experiment on phishing risks
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However, the results are robust to other variables as well since 99.15% of the subjects who filled
in any field did so for all three fields asked. Finally, Fill|Visit is an indicator variable for
whether subjects filled in the password given that they had clicked on the link (hence excluding
subjects who did not visit the website). The average of Fill|Visit can be interpreted as the prob-
ability to fill in the password field conditional on visiting the phishing website. It informs us
whether subjects recognized the phishing fraud only after they visited the website.
We performed two types of analysis that were chosen to account for cluster randomized tri-
als (the clusters being basic units described in section 2.2). First, we tested the effectiveness of
interventions by weighted t-tests on cluster averages of Visit, Fill and Fill|Visit. For each pair of
treatments, the weighted t-test compared the percentages of subjects falling for phishing email
of all clusters (basic units) of one treatment with those of the other treatment, but weighting
the percentages by the cluster size. Next, we performed logistic regressions on all three vari-
ables of interests with standard errors clustered at basic unit level. We also controlled for treat-
ment group, gender, employment contract, organizational division and age.
Results
Weighted t-tests
Figs 1 and 2 display, for the whole and reduced sample respectively, the proportion of subjects
falling for phishing email in each treatment group for each measure, and reports the signifi-
cance level of the weighted t-tests. The detailed results of weighted-t tests are given in S3 Table.
We describe here the results for the whole sample. Treatment effects are larger when excluding
division C. While a third of the subjects in the Control group failed to recognize that the
received mail was a phishing mail and clicked on the link, the proportion of people visiting the
phishing website dropped by 7 to 9 percentage points in the intervention groups.
Among those who visited the link, 68% also filled in their password in the Control group.
This proportion was very similar in Info, being only reduced by 4 points, which was not signifi-
cant. By contrast, Fill|Visit was 58% in Exp, and 54% in ExpInfo, both significantly lower than
in the Control group. The difference between Info and ExpInfo was also significant at a 1%
level. The differences between interventions, on the other hand, were not significant with the
exception of Info and ExpInfo in Fig 1C.
Fig 1. Percentages of subjects falling for phishing email (whole sample). Stars indicating significance levels for difference of each treatment group
compared to the control group with � p< 0.10, �� p< 0.05, ��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.g001
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The unconditional frequency of subjects filling in their password, as measured by Fill, was
22% in Control, and dropped to 16%, 14%, and 13% in Info, Exp, and ExpInfo respectively. The
effects were stronger after exclusion of Division C. A decrease of 8 percentage points in Fill
means about 200 fewer passwords given away in each of the intervention treatments than in
Control. Implementing these simple interventions for an organization of the size of the minis-
try can avoid that 800 passwords are given to hackers.
Regression analysis
The results above gave us a first glimpse on the effect of interventions on tackling phishing
fraud. As explained above, randomization was only done at the level of basic units, and the size
of those varied across organizational divisions. Moreover, as described in section “Group for-
mation” we found some differences between groups in some descriptive statistics when divi-
sion C was excluded. To account for these differences, we additionally ran logistic regressions
with clustered standard errors, controlling for descriptive variables and divisions. This second
type of analysis also informed us on the characteristics of the employees who were more prone
to click on a dubious link or give away their password. Table 4 presents the average marginal
effects of each independent variable on the predicted probability of falling for the phishing
email estimated on observation values. We discuss below the effects for the whole sample. The
effect sizes were larger after excluding division C and we only describe them when they lead to
different conclusions. As a robustness check we ran panel logistic regression with random
effects using our basic units as panel variable (identifier). Our results were robust to this speci-
fication (see S4 Table).
There is strong evidence that all treatments have a significant negative effect. The probabil-
ity of visiting the phishing website decreased by around 6 points in the Info treatment and 8
points with the other two interventions. The marginal effects of the three interventions were
about the same when we studied the probability to fill in the password (see column Fill) instead
of the probability to click on the link (column Visit). The probability to fill in a password con-
ditional on visiting the website was reduced by 10 points in the Exp group and by 15 points in
the ExpInfo group. The effect of Info on Fill|Visit was not significant on the whole sample, but
it was when excluding division C. We tested the differences between the treatment effects and
found no significant difference, with three exceptions. The effect of Info on Fill|Visit was
Fig 2. Percentages of subjects falling for phishing email (excluding division C). Stars indicating significance levels for difference of each treatment
group compared to the control group with � p< 0.10, �� p< 0.05, ��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.g002
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smaller than that of ExpInfo in the whole sample and the effects of Info on Fill and on Visit
were smaller than those of Exp after excluding division C (see S5 Table).
We found some evidence that men were more likely to click on the phishing link but less
likely to fill in their password afterwards once they were on the website. Even if men were not
more likely than women to give away their password overall (no gender effect on Fill), their pro-
pensity to click on phishing links could pose a threat when such links trigger malware down-
load. The younger age group (16-25) was the least likely to visit the phishing website.
Employees between 36 and 45 were 9% more likely to click on the link than the 16-25 age group
and those above 46 were almost 15% more likely to click on the link than the youngest group.
The effect of age on the probability to fill in the password conditional on visiting the website
were not robust to excluding division C and we therefore refrain from commenting them.
Discussion
In our field experiment, we observed a non-negligible proportion of subjects falling into a
phishing attack. An information campaign substantially reduced that risk, and letting subjects
Table 4. Logistic regression analysis—Average marginal effects.
dy/dx—Whole sample dy/dx—excluding division C
Visit Fill Fill|Visit Visit Fill Fill|Visit
Treatment
Control reference
Info -0.062�
(0.026)
-0.056��
(0.021)
-0.050
(0.027)
-0.083���
(0.020)
-0.082���
(0.016)
-0.103���
(0.027)
Exp -0.082���
(0.023)
-0.078���
(0.018)
-0.102���
(0.031)
-0.124���
(0.019)
-0.112���
(0.012)
-0.135���
(0.037)
ExpInfo -0.079���
(0.019)
-0.087���
(0.017)
-0.148���
(0.030)
-0.097���
(0.016)
-0.099���
(0.015)
-0.154���
(0.034)
Gender
male 0.042���
(0.010)
0.017
(0.011)
-0.041
(0.024)
0.029�
(0.012
0.005
(0.013)
-0.054�
(0.027)
Employee contract
Internal Employee 0.025
(0.019)
-0.000
(0.012)
-0.064�
(0.027)
0.028
(0.018)
0.006
(0.012)
-0.048
(0.028)
Age group
16-25 reference
26-35 0.035
(0.027)
0.027
(0.019)
0.073
(0.100)
0.029
(0.029)
0.001
(0.025)
-0.095
(0.108)
36-45 0.093���
(0.027)
0.067���
(0.018)
0.114
(0.090)
0.072�
(0.030)
0.024
(0.023)
-0.097
(0.085)
46-55 0.147���
(0.027)
0.118���
(0.017)
0.192�
(0.089)
0.131���
(0.031)
0.075��
(0.024)
-0.025
(0.083)
>55 0.147���
(0.031)
0.138���
(0.022)
0.264��
(0.094)
0.122���
(0.033)
0.091��
(0.028)
0.063
(0.097)
Division dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10929 10929 2869 7994 7994 1947
Division dummies are added with division B as reference category.
Standard errors in parentheses
� p < 0.05,
�� p < 0.01,
��� p< 0.001
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224216.t004
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experience a phishing email tended to be at least as effective. Personal experience may have led
people to see threats as more probable, and to view themselves as potential future victims, sug-
gesting that cyber-risk beliefs were the most serious barrier to phishing detection. Moreover,
people may be more likely to read phishing and/or debriefing emails than information emails.
We were not able to investigate this because we could not check whether subjects opened/read
the emails we sent. We cannot exclude that the experience intervention was effective because it
made employees believe that their employer could know whether they easily give away their
password.
It has been argued that information becomes more relevant if it is given after individuals
experience the phishing email. Many suggested that combining the two types of intervention
yields the best results by reinforcing the effect of each other [14, 15, 19, 20]. Surprisingly, in
our experiment, the effectiveness of combining both experience and information did not differ
from the effectiveness of experience alone. A possible explanation was that the experience
intervention increased employees’ perceived risk enough for them to acquire knowledge on
their own or activated previously existing knowledge. Another possible explanation for the
absence of synergy is the existence of a ceiling effect. It may be difficult to reduce the propor-
tion of password given away much below 10% with simple interventions as ours. Our results
question whether it is worth piling up interventions against phishing fraud. Each intervention
requires sending several emails to users. In organizations in which people complain about get-
ting too many emails and cognitive overload, one may prefer to focus on the most effective
intervention.
Info and Exp differed in terms of content (infographics versus a phishing email) but also in
terms of dates in which this content was sent. It allowed us to combine both interventions in
Exp but it decreased the comparability between Info and Exp. We should therefore be careful
when comparing the effects of these two treatments. If anything, we would have expected the
Info treatment, with more emails and those being sent closer in time to the final phishing
email, to be more effective than the Exp treatment. This is not what was found. However, it is
sound to compare the effect of infographics on its own with the effect of infographics when
combined with experience. We expected the latter to be larger, but it was not the case.
The Exp treatment involved a first phishing email followed by a debriefing email. We
dubbed the corresponding intervention ‘experience’ but it involved both experience and feed-
back. Our feedback was rather limited (see S4 Fig) and independent of whether people had vis-
ited the phishing website and whether they had given their password. Further research could
vary the degree of feedback and how personalized it is.
We have interpreted filling in the password field as giving away their password but we can-
not know whether they provided their true password or not. What they provided was not
saved, for privacy and safety reasons, and we did not have access to their true password any-
how. It could be that some people filled in fake information. We should therefore be cautious
with this part of the results. Even if the provided information was not correct, having visited
the link already posed a threat. Visiting fraudulent links makes people susceptible to malware
attacks and this behavior should be eliminated in the first place.
The treatment effects we observed were slightly lower for the analysis on the whole sample
than after excluding division C. In division C, a message was posted online after treatments
Exp and ExpInfo received the first phishing email, thereby affecting the Control and Info
groups as well. If anything, the results on the whole sample give us the lower bound. The effec-
tiveness of experience could also be studied, but in a less controlled way, by comparing the
proportion of subjects falling for phishing in the first email and the second email in the two
treatments in which two phishing emails were sent. However, this would only be possible if the
tests were identical. About 15% of subjects in Exp and ExpInfo groups clicked on the link in
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the first email while more than 20% did so in the second email. The difference can come from
the second email being more difficult to detect than the first one but also from sending the
debriefing email earlier after the first phishing email than after the second. By contrast, com-
paring the Exp and ExpInfo treatments with the control as we did in the result section does not
suffer from such possible confounds.
Making people more aware of phishing threats and asking them to report suspicious emails
may backfire in high number of false positives, i.e., employees misjudging genuine emails and
reporting them to the IT department. Kleitman et al. [26] studied which characteristics influ-
ence phishing susceptibility but also false positives. We do not have evidence about false posi-
tives in our experiment. The operations department of the ministry, in charge of information
security, did not report that it was a problem at the time of the study. The official policy was
that people should report any doubtful email, the cost of a false positive being judged much
lower than that of successful phishing. However, this reasoning was based on the experience of
the operations department and their cost-benefit analysis at the time of the experiment. In
other instances, anti-phishing campaigns may create a burden on IT departments and generate
other organizational costs if the rate of false positives upsurges.
Conclusion
In a field experiment, we studied the effect of experience, information, and their combination
on employees’ reaction to phishing emails. Our information treatment was designed to have a
maximal impact, with infographics and clear messages. We could expect the infographics to be
especially effective after a first (simulated) phishing experience. Each intervention in isolation
had a large effect on the probability to click on a dubious link and to give away personal details.
Combining both interventions did not substantially increase the effect of experience alone,
even though subjects in the experience treatment were only exposed to one experience. Our
results question the opportunity of piling up (costly) interventions.
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